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What Does it Mean to Have a Right?
by Prof. Dr. Dieter Birnbacher
bstract: This contribution oﬀers an
introduction into the language of
rights and the role rights play in et-
hics and law, with special reference to the rights
of children. It emerges that there are a number
of very diﬀerent functions characteristic of
‘rights talk’, both in ethics and law, and that
many of them oﬀer opportunities for strengthe-
ning appeals to moral and legal principles
while others involve pitfalls that should be
avoided. In conclusion, two of the theoretical
questions raised by rights are addressed: whet-
her the concept of rights can be replaced wit-
hout loss by the concept of obligation, and
whether rights should be seen as social con-
structs derived from obligations, or whether it
is more plausible to reverse the order of prio-
rity.
The language of rights – a powerful ethi-
cal and political device
The language of rights is a particularly
 forceful device in moral and political debate.
No other term is better suited to express
strong moral emotions and political convic-
tions. ‘Rights talk’ always carries a conside-
rable emphasis, and this seems due to the
fact that the language of rights from its very
nature focuses on the perspective of those
who have something to gain from a given
moral or legal relationship. Though it is
 widely agreed that rights, at least in their
 primary sense, are correlated with duties or
obligations, and that to ascribe a right to
 someone implies ascribing a corresponding
duty or obligation to someone else, the
language of rights brings the recipient of
these obligations sharply in view and
 remains silent on those who are expected to
accept these obligations and to act in accor-
dance with them. This focus explains, at
least in part, the greater power of the
language of rights over the moral emotions.
In general, it will be much easier to bring
people to fight for the rights of A than for
the fulfillment of their or others' duties
 towards A.
The focus on the perspective of the right-
holder is only one aspect of the central
function of the language of rights (which is
particularly relevant in the context of chil-
dren's rights), its advocacy function. Who -
ever claims that a person A has (or should
have) a certain right makes himself an advo-
cate of A. He takes the side of A and makes
it clear that he is prepared to defend A's
right against anyone who fails to respect it,
either in practice, by not observing it, or in
theory, by calling into question A's legiti-
mate possession of the right. In many cases,
the advocacy function goes further and in-
cludes, beyond appealing to relevant persons
expected to fulfill A's right, an appeal to a
wider community. In these cases, the advo-
cacy is not only directed to those identified
individuals immediately concerned with A,
but at an unidentified, anonymous and in-
definite totality such as the community of
politicians, society, or even, as in the case of
human rights, mankind.
Within the advocacy function typical of
‘rights talk’ a division can be made between
the kind of norms or principles to which the
ascription of rights appeal. One use is to
 appeal to the norms and principles that are
part of a system of moral or legal norms
 widely recognized in a moral or legal com-
munity. This use might be termed the
 enforcing use. Rights held by A are appealed
to in order to enforce obligations on the part
of B whenever this seems required by
 hesitation or failure on the part B to act in
accordance with these rights. The invocation
of rights in this sense is of the nature of a
 reminder. It is understood that B recognizes
A's right and has no reason to question the
legitimacy of these rights or of the claims
based on it. The main purpose of the
 reminder is to draw B's attention to impli-
cations these rights have for his own dealings
with A. B, for example, has subscribed to the
right to free speech all the time, but under
certain circumstances B must be reminded
of the fact that this right applies even to the
expression of opinions that he thinks
 morally or politically disastrous. In these
cases, the advocacy inherent in the language
of rights is based on a shared normative
 system the vitality of which depends on a
continuous process of mutual monitoring.
Viewed from the angle of society at large, it
functions as device of normative self-control
and self-correction to which various social
institutions contribute: politicians and other
opinion leaders, the courts, the media and
the general public.
A second function of the language of rights
is the appeal to rights that are not, or not
yet, part of the respective normative system
but are postulated as necessary or desirable
additions by moral or political reformers.
This is the manifesto use of the language of
rights or, as it may be termed, its revisionary
use. In this use, rights are postulated in the
knowledge that they are not as a matter of
fact recognized, or only in special cases or by
very few communities, with the hope that
they will come to be recognized more widely
at some future point of time. This use is
 perhaps even more typical of ‘rights talk’
than the first one because it brings out its
characteristic surplus normativity. Appealing
to rights does not only signify that they
should be observed where observance is in
some way deficient, but that they should be
recognized in the first place. Rights, in this
use, typically have a distinctly utopian  flavor.
They call for changes in the system of
 morality and/or law that are hoped for but
not necessarily expected to come about. The
reference to rights is counter factual rather
than of the nature of a mere reminder. This
is evident in fields such as  international law
where the institutions  necessary to enforce
the rights formally  asserted by international
declarations are  notoriously non-existent.
An extreme example is the universal right to
periodic holidays with pay declared in art.
24 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights.
The revisionary function is a  frequent char -
acteristic especially of the proclamation of
moral rights: Moral rights are postulated
with an intention to transform them into
legal rights by changing the legal system
 accordingly and by providing the  in sti -
tutions necessary for their enforcement.
 Ethics precedes politics. John Stuart Mill's
defense, as philosopher and moralist, of the
A
Modesty forbids what the law does
not.
/ Lucius Annaeus Seneca /
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accept certain obligations and to think about
devising, constructing and  entertaining in-
stitutions suited to meet them. Most rights
postulated in the manifes to sense, including
the rights of future  generations, have to be
classified as in rem rights in this sense. The
same applies to the rights stated in the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child.
It is no accident that in rem rights are mostly
moral rights. They are typically postulated
with the purpose to establish legal rights
where they do not yet exist and to establish
the institutions necessary for their being
 respected within a society's given framework.
This sheds light on important characteristics
by which legal rights diﬀer from moral
rights. Establishing legal rights is a move in
a language game that is essentially pragmatic.
As a pragmatic device, legal rights are  judged
primarily by their instrumentality, i. e. by
the extent to which they serve the ends they
are designed for. One of these ends is the
 safeguarding of moral rights. Moreover, legal
rights are relative, both in factual and in
 normative respects. Not only is it possible
that a person can have a certain legal right
in one legal community and none in a
neighboring one, it is also the case that these
rights often make no stronger claim than
that to be valid in a certain society and
 within a certain period of time. Not only
can the institutions capable of enforcing
legal rights be created and abolished at will,
but even the legal rights themselves are
 subject to change. Against this, the claim to
validity that goes with moral rights is uni-
versal. If A has a moral right, A has this right
no matter whether this right is in fact
 recognized or respected. A can possess this
right even if it is not respected by the
 majority of existing societies. While a state-
ment that A has a legal right is descriptive
and particular, a statement that A has a
moral right is normative and universal. As a
move in the moral language game, the
 ascription of a moral right shares the claim
to universal validity built into the very
language of morality, however illusory (or
hypocritical) this claim may seem on the
background of historical and cultural relativ -
ity. The other side of the coin is that moral
rights are largely ineﬀectual as long as they
are not transformed into legal rights and
made part of a system of law that sanctions
violations. As a rule, a promisee is well  ad -
vised to safeguard the moral rights accruing
to him from a promise by the legal rights
going with a legal contract. Though moral -
ity by itself is not without its own sanctions,
tion of A to him- or herself or to God. If, ac-
cording to traditional Christian thinking,
nobody has a right to suicide, this means no
more than that suicide is illegitimate, quite
independently from the relations in which
the individual stands to others and inde-
pendently from whether the verdict is justi-
fied by any obligations he may have to
others. 
In personam vs. in rem rights
In its standard use, to have a right means to
stand in a certain normative relation to
 others, namely that of having a legitimate
claim against them. If A is declared to have a
right against B, A is thereby ascribed a
 legitimate expectation that B, by acting or
forbearing to act in appropriate ways,  respects
that right, and a corresponding  obligation on
the part of B to do what B owes to A as his or
her due. This kind of right can be of one of
two natures (or both). 
If A has a legitimate claim against one or
more concrete persons, one can speak of an
in personam right. If the claim is against an
indefinite totality of persons such as society
or humanity at large, one can speak of an in
rem right. The paradigm example of an in
personam right is the right involved in the
institution of promises. It is an essential part
of promising that the promisor confers a
right on the promisee to expect and to de-
mand the fulfillment of the promise. The
promise establishes a moral relation between
the partners that is highly personalized and
highly asymmetric, by defining one of the
partners as the right-holding and the other
as the right-fulfilling party. Another typical
case of an in personam right is the right of
the child to be cared for by its parents. Here
again, the distribution of rights and obliga-
tions is highly asymmetric, but diﬀerently
from the promise case the right is not estab -
lished by a free agreement but by a ‘natural’
relation. A further diﬀerence is that in the
case of the child the right-holder is also the
beneficiary of the right, whereas in the case
of a promise the beneficiary can be a third
party. If B has promised A to do something
for A's child, A's child is the beneficiary of
the promise but not necessarily the holder
of the right involved in the promise. An
 example of an in rem right is the right to
work. It is clear society at large is the ad-
dressee of this right, but it is far from clear
how fulfillment of this right is to be  secured
and who is concretely obligated by it. As
such, it is an abstract right without concrete
addressee. It appeals to society as a whole to
moral right of women to political participa-
tion preceded his (unsuccessful) attempt to
bring about a vote for women's suﬀrage as a
Member of Parliament. 
Rights - some distinctions
To a semantic purist, the fact that the
language of rights takes over important
 rhetorical functions must seem a mixed
 blessing. He will approach ‘rights’ with a
double suspicion. First, like other rhetori-
cally colored concepts in morality and poli-
tics like ‘freedom’ or ‘human dignity’, the
concepts of rights is liable to inflation,
 thereby blurring its contours and weakening
its normative force. Second, its very popu-
larity as a rhetorical device tends to make
people less inclined to take account of the
semantic diﬀerences that exist between the
various uses of this concept in theory and
practice. 
I will refrain, in the following, to practice
 semantic purism and to present the myriad
of distinctions and classifications that have
been proposed concerning rights in philoso-
phy and political science. A minimum of
 distinctions, however, is necessary to make
transparent, in the words of Joel Feinberg's
title, "the nature and value of rights" (Fein-
berg 1980, 143 ﬀ.) and to clarify what it is
that is postulated in so many moralities,
constitutions, declarations and manifestos.
One first distinction is that between the
standard relational use of the term ‘right’
where rights refer to a relation between a
right-holder A and a B who is correspond -
ingly obligated by this right, and the non-
 relational use in which to have a right just
means that one is permitted to do some-
thing. In many contexts we can phrase the
statement that A is morally or legally per-
mitted to act in the way he does by saying
that A has a right to act in this way. 
To have a right, in this non-standard sense,
means that A is under no obligation to act
otherwise than he in fact does. Thus, in
 saying that in any free society everyone has
the right to act as he wishes as far as this in
accordance with existing law one expresses
the thought that everyone is permitted to do
what he does provided this is not prohibited
by an existing law. There is, in this use, no
question of a special relation, constituted by
a right, in which the individual stands to
other persons or to society at large. Whet-
her A has the right or not need not depend
on any interpersonal relations between A
and others. That A is permitted to do some-
thing might be seen to follow from the rela-
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parents or, alternatively, by a guardian, and
to receive the health care and education
 necessary for its development into an auto-
nomous person. To have a negative claim-
right means not to be exposed to certain
violations of one's integrity and correspond -
ing risks, for example by physical violence
or psychological torture. The corresponding
duties on the part of others are partly
 negative and partly positive. Others are not
only required not to infringe on or to
 endanger the integrity of the right-holder,
but also to actively provide the means
 necessary for achieving the good safeguarded
by the right. These are usually taken to
 include whatever may be necessary to
 provide for the personal safety of the right-
holder. In the case of children and other
 particularly vulnerable groups, rights are
mostly of the nature of negative and positive
claim-rights. This must not blind us, how -
ever, to the fact that the members of vulner -
able groups also enjoy liberties. Some of
these may even conflict with the fulfillment
of rights, such as in cases in which children
refuse a medical treatment which they have
a right to receive. A typical example of a
claim-right in this sense is the provision of
the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child that the system of adoption shall
 ensure that the best interests of the child shall
be the paramount consideration (art. 21).
A right can be classified as a power if it
 confers on an individual the opportunity to
change the moral or legal relations in which
he stands to others. In modern societies, this
kind of right has become more and more
important with the growing liberty of the in-
dividual to establish, within certain limits,
his roles and relations by his own will. The
individual has successively become free to
control the moral and legal obligations
 incumbent on him by making autonomous
choices how far to bind himself by contracts,
promises and personal bonds.
It goes without saying that distinguishing
these kinds of rights does not mean to ignore
their interrelations, both logical and factual.
Powers are logically dependent on liberties.
Liberties are factually dependent on claim-
rights, at least if they are not meant as formal
guarantees but as entitlements that the
 individual has a realistic chance to exercise
Intergenerational Justice Review
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in practice. The distinction according to
content is also relevant for the question of
who qualifies as holder of the respective
right. Since each kind of right is concerned
with a certain kind of good, there are logical
limits to the range of subjects that qualify as
right-holders. A right, whether moral or legal,
can only be ascribed to beings to which the
corresponding good can be ascribed. As a
consequence, the range of rights that can be
ascribed to animals is narrower than that for
children, which is again narrower than that
for adults. Animals do not qualify as
 candidates for the ascription of liberties, or
only to the extent that they are capable of
intentional action. They do not qualify as
candidates for powers. They do qualify,
 however, as holders of positive and negative
claim-rights to the extent that their good
 depends, among others, on how they are
treated by humans. Infants do not ordinar i -
ly qualify as candidates for civil rights such
as the right to vote (except vicariously). But
they obviously qualify for claim-rights such
as the right to physical and mental integrity
and to being provided with the means
 necessary for their development to maturity.
There is, then, no once-for-all answer to the
question of who qualifies as a bearer of
rights. It depends on the kind of right in
question. In general, the range of beings to
which claim-rights can be ascribed is wider
than that to which liberties and powers can
be ascribed. And it follows that there is no
reason to uphold the time-honored doctrine
of the reciprocity of rights and duties accord -
ing to which rights can only be held by
beings that are capable of having duties. This
doctrine is a non-starter because it overlooks
the central function of the ascription of
rights, its advocacy function. A being such
as a sentient animal, an infant or a demen-
ted adult is no less qualified as right-holder
by not being able to put forward its rights
or even to know about them. On the
 contrary, because of their dependency on
 others these beings are particularly in need
of having their rights respected. 
Another relevant observation is that the legal
system is considerably more generous in
 ascribing rights than the moral code. As an
essentially pragmatic device it is much more
free to ascribe rights to non-personal  entities
that would not qualify as holders of moral
rights, such as trusts and heritages or (con-
cerning the right to inherit) the nasciturus,
the child yet to be born.
Another distinction that is of special impor-
tance for the relationship between parents
130
these are in general too weak to provide the
trust required for cooperation.
In some legal systems, legal protection of
 interests is graded by distinguishing between
objective and subjective rights. Rights are
 objective if the legal system imposes legal
duties on citizens to respect certain limits in
their dealings with one another and with
third parties. Rights are subjective if the legal
system makes provisions for opportunities
of the right-holders to have their rights
 protected by legal action, either by laying
complaint against violations in person or by
advocates. In many countries, minors have
subjective rights, whilst animals have only
objective rights. Both have rights that are
protected by law. But only children are
 capable of being vicariously represented by
trustees who secure their rights on their
 behalf.
Liberties, claim-rights and powers
Another distinction between rights that
 dominates the theory of rights is that by
their respective content. The favoured
 approach is to classify the content of moral
or legal rights by the kind of goods that the
exercise of the right is intended to safeguard.
In the case of liberties, this is primarily free-
dom and privacy, in the case of claim-rights
it is primarily integrity and opportunities, in
the case of powers it is the interest in auto-
nomously structuring one's social relations
by establishing contracts and other agree-
ments with others.
A right can be classified as a liberty if it
means that A is free to act as he wishes
 without the interference of others. In  par tic -
ular, a liberty can be positive (right to free
speech) or negative (right not to serve in the
army). In each case the corresponding duty
is negative, that of non-interference. If A has
a liberty, B has an obligation not to interfere
in A's exercise of the liberty, whether this
consists in an activity or a forbearance. An
example for a liberty in the context of
 children's rights is art.13, 1 of the UN
 Convention on the Rights of the Child,
which assures the child freedom of expres-
sion.
With claim-rights the diﬀerences between
the positive and the negative versions are
more pronounced. To have a positive claim-
right means to be entitled to being provided
with some good (such as, for example, the
means of subsistence, health care or work
opportunities) by certain identified persons
or by society at large. In this sense, a small
child has a claim-right to be cared for by its
At his best, man is the noblest of all
animals; separated from law and
 justice he is the worst.
/ Aristotle /
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tive, for example if helping a friend in need
is given priority over holding a promise on
which nothing much depends. Rights are of
varying normative weight, and at least those
of relatively low priority may well be judged
to be negotiable even with imperfect duties. 
Among the metaethical issues surrounding
rights two stand out as being the subject of
repeated and fundamental controversies.
One is the issue whether the language of
rights can be completely substituted by the
language of duties. Some of the philosophical
defenders of what has been called the
 redundancy theory of rights (such as Richard
Brandt1) have expressed doubts whether the
particular psychological force of the
language of rights can be reproduced by
using only duty-talk. But they think that at
least the semantic content of the language of
rights is fully reproducible in the language
of duties. Though this theory has found
quite a number of adherents,2 there are
 reasons to doubt whether it is adequate. For
one, the correspondence with rights (on the
part of the recipient) changes the semantic
content of the concept of duty in its applica -
tion to those ‘perfect’ duties that are of
 central relevance to morality and law as
 normative systems. At least for moral rights,
having a right is more than being the object
of others' moral duties. Diﬀerently from
 duties without corresponding rights, the
right-holder can claim the fulfillment of his
right as something that is due to him and for
which, if fulfilled, gratitude would be out of
place. Whoever has a right not to starve,
need not wait for others to give him to eat.
He is in a position to demand that he gets
what is owed to him. One might even go
further and follow Joel Feinberg by saying
that rights seem to involve a second-order
right that entitles the right-holder to claim,
under appropriate circumstances, the fulfill-
ment of his right.3 Conferring a right on
 someone means more than to postulate the
legitimacy of a claim. It means to encourage
and to support the right-holder in the
 attempt to make appropriate claims. This
connotation of empowerment explains the
close connection between the possession of
rights on the one hand and self-respect and
human dignity on the other. Moreover, the
redundancy theory fails to do justice to the
advocacy function of rights. Conferring a
Intergenerational Justice Review
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rights, each in accordance with its respective
normative weight. In German constitutional
law it is agreed that even those basic rights
that are granted without inherent limits do
not hold absolutely but can in practice be
 limited if their exercise conflicts with other
inherently unlimited basic rights. Only a  so-
called ‘core content’ of these rights is taken
to partake of the non-negotiability that is
characteristic of the right to human dignity
(and its protection by the state) in the first
article of the German constitution. The
same holds for moral rights such as the right
to physical integrity or the rights acquired
by accepting a promise. For both rights,
 situations are easily thinkable in which they
have to cede, on reflection, to the rights of
others provided these carry more weight
than the right sacrificed. It is a moot  question,
however, whether rights are negotiable not
only against rights but also against duties
without corresponding rights, i. e. to those
duties traditionally termed ‘imperfect
 duties’. Examples of ‘imperfect’ duties are
the duty of generosity and the duty to come
to the aid of the needy. Diﬀerently from
‘perfect’ duties that correspond to a right on
the part of the recipient, imperfect duties
leave the moral agent more choice in deter-
mining who is to receive the good the agent
is morally bound to provide and in what
exact way this is carried out. If I have
 contracted a debt it is usually clear who it is
whom I owe the money and in what way
and at what point of time I am expected to
pay it back. The same holds for other  perfect
duties like fulfill ing a promise or seeing to it
that my child at-
tends school. With
‘imperfect duties’
this is diﬀerent. I
have a choice about
the who, how and when of charitable giving,
and I have more leeway to exercise my per-
sonal preferences. Charity is nothing I owe
to its recipients. Is it legitimate to make an
 ’imperfect duty’ take precedence over a
 ’perfect duty’? Is it morally unobjectionable
to break a promise in cases in which this
conflicts with coming to the aid of someone
in need? This is answered in the negative by
a great many philosophers, among them
Kant and Schopenhauer, and there are many
examples for which this answer seems ade-
quate.  Normally, it is no excuse for not pay-
ing back a debt that more good would be
done by spending the money on a needy
friend. For other cases, the doctrine of priory
of rights over duties is clearly counterintui-
and children is that between mandatory and
discretionary rights. Mandatory rights are
rights that are conjoined with a duty to
 exercise the right. While liberties and powers
are, in general, discretionary in the sense that
the right-holder is free to exercise the right,
some particular liberties and powers are
mandatory in so far as they constrain their
exercise. Thus, parents have the legal right
to bring up their children and thereby the
right to exercise their own personal
 preferences, for example (though with
 certain limitations) in point of religion, but
this right is conjoined with a corresponding
obligation. The right to vote, in some coun-
tries, goes together with an obligation to
vote. Something similar holds for certain
claim-rights. Thus, children have a legal
claim-right to education in the sense that
 society has a duty to provide adequate
 educational opportunities. On the other
hand, this right is mandatory by being
 conjoined with a duty. Children in general
have no choice to go to school or not as soon
they have reached schooling age. Another
type of right that is similar to a mandatory
right in restricting the options open to the
right-holder are inalienable rights. In this
case, the right-holder is free to exercise the
right he possesses, but he is not free to
 renounce the right or to exchange it for
money or other goods, thereby permanently
depriving himself of the opportunity of
 exercising the right. In this way, the right to
freedom is customarily understood both in
morality and in (constitutional) law. The
right to freedom implies the right not to
exercise this right in particular situations,
but it does not imply a right to sell oneself
into slavery.
The ethics and metaethics of rights
There are a number of controversial ethical
and metaethical issues that regularly come
up in discussions about rights and which can
fruitfully be debated without going too
 deeply into substantive questions concern -
ing concrete rights and their limits. One
such issue is the status of rights in cases of
conflict with other rights or duties.
It is generally agreed that rights are, as a rule,
not absolute but have the status of prima
facie rights, i. e. can and must be negotiated
with other rights in cases in which conflict -
ing rights cannot be respected at the same
time. Thus, liberties are commonly held to
be restricted by claim-rights and claim-rights
by liberties, so that any one right is limited
in its range by other items in the system of
131
No man is above the law and no man is below it: nor do we 
ask any man's permission when we ask him to obey it. 
/ Theodore Roosevelt /
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right on someone does not only encourage
the right-holder to put forward his right, but
also others to speak up in his name, especially
if the right-holder is temporarily or perma-
nently unable to do so himself.
Another controversial question is of interest
primarily for ethical theorists. The question
is whether rights are fundamental or deriva-
tive in the order of logical priority. Should
rights be seen as social constructs that are -
in some circuitous way - derived from  duties
or is it the other way round, so that rights
are the fundamental category? Joel Feinberg
speaks for many legal philosophers in
 preferring the first route: "It is because I have
a claim-right not to be punched in the nose
by you, ... that you have a duty not to punch
me in the nose. It does not seem to work the
other way round."4This shows that for Fein-
berg rights are more fundamental than  duties.
It does not show that rights are the last
word. In a later remark Feinberg makes it
clear that interests are the fundamental cate-
gory and that it is they that lie at the basis of
both rights and duties: "My claim and your
duty both derive from the interest that I have
in the physical integrity of my nose."5 Both
rights and duties function to protect inte-
rests, either actual or prospective, with rights
protecting those interests that are
 particularly crucial for a good life. However,
the fact that there are ‘imperfect duties’ that
do not correspond to rights militates against
Feinberg's proposed order of priority.
 ’Imperfect duties’ protect the conditions of
a good life in the same way as ‘perfect du-
ties’ do. The only diﬀerence is that the corre-
spondence with rights enables society to put
additional pressure on the fulfillment of
 perfect moral duties. This explains why many
132
philosophers, including Kant and Mill, have
seen a close connection between perfect
moral duties and duties that it is  legitimate to
enforce by legal sanctions. Another  argument
for the priority of duties over rights is that it
is easy to imagine a  system of  morality or of
law without rights, but that it is impossible
to imagine a system of morality or law with -
out duties. In a world of angels where
everyone did what duty  enjoins, rights might
in fact become redundant.
Notes:
1. Brandt 1959: 440.
2. E. g., Frey 1980.
3. Feinberg 1980: 141.
4. Feinberg 1992: 205.
5. Feinberg 1992: 205.
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In the state of nature...all men are
born equal, but they cannot continue
in this  equality. Society makes them
lose it, and they recover it only by the
protection of the law. 
/ Charles de Montesquieu /
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